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Arguably, proportionality is at its most persuasive when stated in its simplest form:1 that the severity 
of the punishment should reflect the seriousness of the offence. The law is justified in meting out 
greater punishment on a murderer than a petty thief, not necessarily because the former is more 
likely to reoffend or poses a greater threat to public safety, but because of the seriousness of his 
offence. Numerous contemporary sentencing practices violate this basic form of desert. These are 
often based on the supposed dangerousness of the offender (e.g. imprisonment for public protection 
and life without parole), or offenders who offend with such frequency that the law determines to 
take a different approach at sentencing (e.g. three-strikes legislation and mandatory minimum 
sentences). These latter provisions are often imposed in part due to the seriousness of the offence, 
but largely in an effort to reduce offending chiefly through deterrence or incapacitation.2 Californian 
three-strikes legislation only applies where the first two offences are ‘serious felonies’, and 
mandatory minimum sentence provisions in England and Wales apply against particular offences. 
Section 110 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCCSA) sets a minimum 
seven-year immediate custodial sentence for a third class-A drug trafficking offence, whilst s.111 
requires the court to impose a prison term not less than three years for a third domestic burglary. 
The court does not have to impose the minimum sentence prescribed if it would be unjust in all the 
circumstances to do so.3 Both sections have the effect of limiting judicial discretion on the basis of 
the offender’s antecedents, the consequence being to all but prohibit short custodial and non-
custodial sentences for offenders falling within these provisions. Whilst these minimum sentences 
fall within the sentencing range for a first-time offender and may therefore be commensurate with 
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the seriousness of the immediate offence, the provisions were not enacted with the intention of 
heralding commensurability. The provisions have been criticised as ‘relatively toothless’4 given that 
the courts would ordinarily impose sentences beyond the minimum set, without need to rely on the 
provisions themselves. Nevertheless, the purpose of these provisions is to ensure minimum 
sentences regardless of the seriousness of the particular offence.  
 
Therefore, for some offences, the legislature has determined that certain previous convictions can 
lead to an incommensurate sentence; that the need to control certain crimes, either through 
deterrence or incapacitation, when committed by repeat offenders usurps desert constraints as the 
primary sentencing determinant. Certain previous convictions are expressly relevant to the 
sentencing decision for some offences. But what is the position where the legislature has not so 
directly interfered with the sentencing decision? When dealing with offenders generally, what is the 
role of previous convictions? Do they usurp offence seriousness as the primary sentencing 
determinant? If so, what role is left for proportionality to play in these cases? 
 
The purpose of this article is to consider the role of proportionality when sentencing repeat 
offenders for offences which do not carry a mandatory minimum sentence for the second, third or so 
transgression. The article is based on the results of a wider study on sentencing practice in theft 
cases.5 It considers 225 cases concerning adult offenders sentenced for theft under the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 when proportionality was the ‘status quo’. The article considers the role of prior 
record at the sentencing stage, in particular the extent to which previous convictions may override 
proportionality constraints. The article also considers the findings from a series of interviews held 
with magistrates and Crown Court judges on the importance of prior record. Finally, the article 
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explores the extent to which the current sentencing regime as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 may have impacted on sentencing practice in relation to previous convictions.  
 
National statistics on Prolific and other Priority Offenders show that theft accounted for 20 per cent 
of proven offences committed by offenders identified as ‘prolific’, significantly more than for any 
other offence group.6 The fact that recent governments have invested resources in producing and 
following up these statistics is evidence of the high policy profile afforded to persistent offenders.7 
The high incidence of thefts committed by prolific offenders renders it a particularly useful offence 
to study. Although the statistics do not refer to the seriousness of individual cases, it is interesting to 
acknowledge that for thefts committed by prolific offenders, immediate custody was the most 
frequently imposed disposal (42 per cent), with a further 8 per cent of offences being dealt with by a 
suspended sentence. Community penalties were imposed in 21 per cent of cases, with fines and 
discharges accounting for nine and 11 per cent of cases respectively. Eight per cent were dealt with 
by some other means (e.g. deferred sentence).8 A study of nearly 1,500 people convicted of theft 
from a shop showed that the average offender had 42 previous convictions.9 
 
Approaches to Punishing Persistence 
There are broadly four approaches to dealing with previous convictions at the sentencing stage. First, 
a flat-rate system would accord no role for previous convictions at sentencing. The severity of the 
sentence imposed would be the same regardless of whether the offender was a first-time offender 
or had an unenviably long history of prior offending. This is the only truly retributive position; 
sentence is determined only by reference to the seriousness of the offence and, arguably, prior 
record has no bearing on this. Furthermore, it has been argued, not only should prior history be 
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disregarded at the sentencing stage as an irrelevance to offence seriousness, but enhancing the 
sentence on the basis of prior offending amounts to punishing the offender twice for his previous 
transgression.10 Despite being loyal to retribution, flat-rate sentencing has relatively few 
supporters.11 The approach fails to appreciate the widely-held intuition that repeat offender should 
be dealt with more severely than first-time offenders.12 Two other approaches have been raised 
which recognise this intuition whilst upholding the principles of proportionality; assigning weight to 
previous convictions at sentencing is not necessarily incompatible with desert. The two differ by 
virtue of divergent views over whether previous criminal history is a source of aggravation, or a lack 
of prior record is a source of mitigation.13 Prior record may be taken into consideration within a 
retributive framework, either on the basis that a clean history demonstrates good character which is 
to be regarded as a source of mitigation, or that an offender’s previous record enhances his 
culpability and therefore acts as an aggravating factor.14 
 
The ‘progressive loss of mitigation’ approach affords only a limited role to prior record at sentencing. 
Under this model, a degree of mitigation is extended upon the first-time offender for his previous 
good character. For each subsequent lapse, the mitigation is reduced until eventually it is exhausted. 
Once the offender has accumulated sufficient previous convictions for the mitigation to be lost, any 
subsequent convictions are not treated as a source of aggravation. Effectively, the progressive loss of 
mitigation model envisages a sentence ceiling which is set by the seriousness of the current offence. 
Once the mitigation for previous good character has been exhausted and the ceiling is reached, no 
greater punishment, which would exceed the ceiling, can be imposed. Progressive loss is based on 
notions of lapse and tolerance.15 Human frailty may lead us to make poor decisions, including 
                                                          
10
 M. Bagaric, ‘Double Punishment and Punishing Character: The Unfairness of Prior Convictions’ (2000) 19 Criminal Justice 
Ethics 10 
11
 Most notably G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978, Little Brown) p.460-6, and R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing 
Based on Equality and Desert (1979, Ballinger) chapter 5 
12
 J. D. Stuart, ‘Retributive Justice and Prior Offences’ (1986) 18(1) The Philosophical Forum 40, at 49 
13
 J. V. Roberts, Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing, (2011, Cambridge University Press), p.222 
14
 J. V. Roberts, Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing, (2011, Cambridge University Press), p.224 
15
 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (2005, Oxford University Press), p.151 
5 
 
criminal decisions, which may be particularly acute in the context of peer pressure and social 
deprivation.16 Accordingly, the sentencing system should recognise these aberrations of weakness by 
offering a sentence discount as limited tolerance of a lapse. This tolerance reduces with each 
subsequent offence until, eventually, the discount is exhausted. At that point, the offender is no 
longer able to legitimately claim that the aberrations were uncharacteristic lapses.17 The offender’s 
plea that the act was out of keeping with his previous behaviour is most persuasive when he has no 
previous convictions. The persuasiveness is progressively lost with each subsequent transgression.18 
 
Two problems with the progressive loss of mitigation approach are yet to be fully dealt with. First, 
how great a discount should be offered for a first offence? Von Hirsch offers nothing more concrete 
than to suggest that a ‘modest discount’ should be granted.19 Given that the seriousness of the 
offence should remain as the principle sentencing determinant, a large discount would give too 
much weight to the offender’s character. The discount should be sufficient to substantiate the 
mitigation owed to the first-time offender without contravening proportionality. The second, and 
somewhat related, problem concerns the rate at which the discount is progressively lost. Von Hirsch 
has suggested tath the discount may be lost after a fourth or fifth offence, although no reasoning is 
offered as to why.20 Martin Wasik proposed that the discount would be exhausted after five 
convictions.21 Subsequently, von Hirsch and Ashworth claimed that this is a matter of judgement: ‘a 
possibility would be that the discount would be lost after about three prior convictions, but there are 
no magic numbers.’22 Whilst the discount may not be exhausted at the same rate in all cases, the 
point of exhaustion should coincide with the moment when the offender can no longer convincingly 
                                                          
16
 A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2010, 5
th
 edition, Cambridge University Press), p.201 
17
 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (2005, Oxford University Press), p.153 
18
 A. von Hirsch, ‘Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing’ (1981) 65 Minnesota Law Review 591, p.597 
19
 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (2005, Oxford University Press), p.149 
20
 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (2005, Oxford University Press), p.149 
21
 M. Wasik, ‘Guidance, Guidelines and Criminal Record’, in K. Pease & M. Wasik, Sentencing Reform: Guidance or 
Guidelines? (1987, Manchester University Press), p.118 
22
 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (2005, Oxford University Press), p.155 
6 
 
claim that his conduct was uncharacteristic. This is likely to occur relatively early in a criminal career, 
certainly before the offender has accumulated more than a handful of convictions.  
 
Although the progressive loss of mitigation model pays some regard to the confines of 
proportionality, it is not an inherently retributive concept.23 It is only after the offender’s third or 
fourth conviction that the proportionate sentence is imposed. Whilst the offender is able to benefit 
from mitigation for a clean (or relatively clean) prior record, the penalty imposed is less than 
proportionate to the seriousness of his offence. However, progressive loss could be regarded as 
consistent with a retributive concept if a more sophisticated desert model was adopted which 
included prior criminal history as a constituent element of offence seriousness. Seriousness would 
thereby be measured in terms of the harm caused, risked or intended by the offence, the culpability 
of the offender in committing the offence, and the offender’s prior record, or at least prior record 
could be relevant to assessing the offender’s culpability. Either way, prior record could be regarded 
as relevant to determining the severity of the punishment deserved for the offence.  
 
An alternative approach – a recidivist premium – has been reintroduced by Julian Roberts which, in 
keeping with the progressive loss of mitigation principle, aims to deal with previous convictions 
within the confines of desert. Unlike progressive loss, this theory does not work on the notion of 
mitigation for a first-time offender. Rather it calls upon a sentence premium for repeat offenders 
whereby greater punishment is imposed on those with a criminal history. The effect is the same as 
with progressive loss: the repeat offender is subject to greater punishment than the first-time 
offender. The difference lies in how the sentence is reached. With progressive loss, a proportionate 
sentence is imposed against the recidivist, whilst the first-time offender receives a discount from 
this. Under the recidivist premium model, the first-time offender receives the proportionate 
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sentence, and the recidivist is dealt with by way of an inflated sentence greater than that which is 
ordinarily deserved for that offence. 
 
Finally, previous convictions could be used as a basis for imposing progressively more severe 
sanctions with each subsequent conviction under a cumulative approach, leading to the very real 
possibility that an offender (particularly a persistent petty offender) could be sentenced primarily on 
the basis of his record rather than in reference to the seriousness of his current offence. A 
cumulative approach could provide mitigation for a first-time offender, and therefore initially 
resemble the progressive loss of mitigation approach. Alternatively, a cumulative system may offer 
no mitigation for a clean prior record, similar to the recidivist premium. However, whilst a sentence 
ceiling is set under both the progressive loss and recidivist premium models, no such ceiling exists 
under a cumulative system. The consequence is that increases in sentence accrue exponentially with 
each subsequent conviction. Proportionality can play only a limited role under a cumulative system, 
and its influence recedes as convictions accrue. 
 
The Role of Previous Convictions in England and Wales 
Criminal Justice Acts 1991 and 1993 
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the common law appeared to support the 
progressive loss of mitigation approach. The Court of Appeal in Queen24 had ruled: 
‘The proper way to look at the matter is to decide on a sentence which is appropriate for the offence 
for which the person is before the court. Then in deciding whether that sentence should be imposed 
or whether the court can properly extend some leniency to the offender, the court must have regard 
to those matters which tell in his favour; and equally to those which tell against him, in particular his 
record of previous convictions.’
25
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The Court’s reference to the potential to extend leniency and the reference to previous convictions 
seemingly suggests that a clean prior record could act in mitigation for the offender. The presence of 
previous convictions, on the other hand, might lead the court to conclude that no such leniency 
should be extended.  
 
Under the 1991 Act, the seriousness of the offence was of paramount importance in determining 
sentence. Section 29(1) of the Act provided that, ‘an offence shall not be regarded as more 
serious...by reason of any previous convictions of the offender or any failure of his to respond to 
previous sentences’, and s.28 permitted the court to have regard to ‘any such matters as, in the 
opinion of the court, are relevant in mitigation...’ Therefore, if the sentencing court was of the 
opinion that a clean prior record could be regarded as a source of mitigation, it would be entitled to 
extend some leniency toward the first-time offender.  
 
Section 29(1) led to some unrest within the judiciary and magistracy who claimed it prevented them 
from taking into account an offender’s criminal record.26 Of course this was Parliamentary intention, 
nevertheless s.29 was ultimately repealed and replaced with a new provision, inserted by s.66(6) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993: 
‘In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court may take into account any 
previous convictions of the offender or any failure of his to respond to previous sentences.’ 
 
The proportionality constraints contained elsewhere within the 1991 Act remained, requiring the 
court to principally determine sentence on the basis of offence seriousness. 27 Wasik and von Hirsch 
argued that the new s.29 should not be viewed as conferring a wide discretion on courts to 
aggravate sentence on the basis of prior record, as this would be impossible to reconcile with other 
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key provisions contained within the Act.28 The wording of the new s.29 was a little unfortunate. On 
the one hand, it stated that previous convictions could be taken into account in considering the 
seriousness of the offence. Thus prior record was itself a relevant factor in assessing the seriousness 
of the offence; an offender sentenced largely on the basis of his prior record would not be sentenced 
disproportionately. On the other hand, the then government was not seeking to introduce a system 
of cumulative sentencing through this provision;29 the intention must then have been to afford only 
a limited role to prior history. Despite this, some Court of Appeal authorities pointed to the courts’ 
use of previous convictions as a source of aggravation, having little regard to proportionality 
constraints. In Spencer & Carby,30 the Court ruled that ‘without doubt the offences for which [the 
offenders] were being dealt with could properly be viewed as more serious by reason of [their] 
appallingly long records.’31 Sentencing statistics at the time indicated that the courts were likely to 
accord significant weight to an offender’s previous convictions.32 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced a new provision on the role of previous 
convictions which purports to place even greater prominence on the offender’s prior history. It 
provides: 
In considering the seriousness of an offence (‘the current offence’) by an offender who has one or 
more previous convictions, the court must treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if 
(in the case of that conviction) the court considers that it can reasonably be so treated having regard, 
in particular, to – 
(a) The nature of the offence to which the conviction relates and its relevance to the current 
offence, and  
(b) The time that has elapsed since the conviction. 
 
                                                          
28
 M. Wasik & A. von Hirsch, ‘Section 29 Revisited: Previous Convictions in Sentencing’ [1994] Crim LR 409, p.412 
29
 Hansard, June 29 1993, col. 906, cited in M. Wasik & A. von Hirsch, above. 
30
 (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 482 
31
 Per Cowan LJ, at 485-6 
32
 For discussion, see J. V. Roberts, ‘Alchemy in Sentencing: An analysis of sentencing reform proposals in England and 
Wales’ (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 425, p.430 
10 
 
The provision is consistent with a cumulative approach whereby the severity of the sentence 
increases with each subsequent conviction. There is no limit to the number of previous convictions 
which can be taken into consideration. The provision seems to adopt a ‘step function’, with 
increments in severity accruing with every (relevant) previous conviction.33 Where an offender has 
amassed a number of recent relevant convictions, the result could be a wildly disproportionate 
sentence which pays little regard to the seriousness of the current offence and instead sentences the 
offender primarily on the basis of his prior record. 
 
One possible interpretation of s.143(2) is to regard previous convictions as an aggravating factor of 
the offence, either on the basis of the harm caused or (more likely) the offender’s culpability. That is 
to say, that the seriousness of the offence itself is increased by virtue of the offender’s prior 
criminality. However, while the then Criminal Justice Bill was passing through Parliament, statements 
were made to confirm that s.143(2) would ‘not mean wildly disproportionate sentences, because the 
sentences will operate within the principle, which is established later in the [Act], that the severity of 
the resulting sentence should reflect the seriousness of the current offence...The clause modifies the 
proportionality principle that previous relevant offences can act as an aggravating factor.’34 Although 
not expressed within the Act, it appears that parliamentary intention was that courts would apply 
s.143(2) within confines set by other provisions reflecting the need to uphold principles of 
proportionality. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has on a number of occasions reaffirmed the principle 
that the sentence imposed must be kept in proportion to the seriousness of the immediate offence, 
despite the offender’s prior record.35 This sentiment raises two points. First, the courts are likely to 
uphold the principle of proportionality even when dealing with a repeat offender. In other words, 
s.143(2) is not, in itself, just reason for departing from the confines of proportionality. Second, prior 
record is not an intrinsic element of the seriousness of an offence; it is not an offence-related 
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aggravating factor. Therefore, the offence itself is not rendered more serious on the basis of prior 
record.    
 
Findings from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the Sentencing Guidelines Council and Sentencing 
Advisory Panel,36 and replaced these with a single Sentencing Council for England and Wales. One of 
the duties of the Council is to ‘monitor the operation and effect of its sentencing guidelines’.37 The 
Council discharges this duty through the Crown Court Sentencing Survey. The Crown Court is required 
to complete a sentencing form each time it sentences an offender for a new offence.38 In an effort to 
limit the burden placed on judges, each sentencing form covers only a single side of A4 paper. As 
such, the survey cannot cover all possible aspects of the case, although it does capture data on the 
number of ‘relevant and recent’ previous convictions taken into consideration by virtue of s.143(2) of 
the 2003 Act. Owing to the fact that the sentencing survey also collects information on other 
aggravating and mitigating factors (in addition to previous convictions), it is not possible to discern 
precisely what impact the prior record had on the sentence imposed.  
 
Findings from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey show that offenders with relevant and recent 
previous convictions are more likely to be imprisoned, with this likelihood increaseing as previous 
convictions accumulate. For all offences covered by the Survey, immediate imprisonment was 
imposed in 44 percent of cases in which no previous convictions were taken into account. This figure 
increases to 64 percent for offenders with between one and three relevant convictions, rising again 
to 76 percent with four to nine convictions, and 79 percent for offenders with ten or more 
convictions.39   
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Whilst it is possible that a large proportion of offences committed by those with prior history would 
warrant imprisonment notwithstanding that history, this may be evidence of previous convictions 
impacting on the severity of the sentence imposed. However, definitive conclusions cannot be made 
because the Survey findings do not consider the seriousness of the offence in each case, and the 
weight attributed to previous convictions in isolation to other factors. What follows here is an 
analysis of theft cases, and the apparent impact criminal history had on the sentencing decision. 
 
The Apparent Influence of the Offender’s Criminal Record 
Table 1 shows the relationship between sentence type and total number of previous convictions. Of 
the 225 cases within the sample, only 16 involved offences committed by first-time offenders; the 
majority of offenders had a record of prior offending, with 172 (76.4%) having ten or more previous 
convictions. The table indicates a moderate distribution of various sentence types amongst offenders 
with differing criminal histories, with discharges and fines used frequently in cases involving 
persistent offenders. The table also shows that the courts may impose custodial or community 
sentences, notwithstanding an offender’s clean prior record. 
Table 1: Sentence Type and Total Previous Convictions 
 Total number of previous convictions 
Total None 1 - 3 4 - 9 10 + 
 
Custody Count 4 1 5 67 77 
%  25.0% 11.1% 17.9% 38.9% 34.2% 
Community Count 6 1 17 57 81 
%  37.5% 11.1% 60.7% 33.3% 36.0% 
Financial Count 3 4 3 22 32 
%  18.8% 44.4% 10.7% 12.8% 14.2% 
Discharge Count 3 3 3 26 35 
%  18.8% 33.3% 10.7% 15.1% 15.5% 
Total Count 16 9 28 172 225 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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There is some evidence to suggest that not all previous convictions are relevant at the sentencing 
stage; that the previous conviction should only be considered if it is similar to the current offence.40 
Table 2 shows the relationship between sentence type and number of previous convictions for theft 
(that is, of the same type as the immediate offence). Whilst fines and discharges may be imposed on 
habitual thieves, they are more likely to be imposed on offenders who do not have a record of similar 
offending. Conversely, custodial sentences are more frequently imposed on those with a history of 
similar offending, although they were on occasion imposed against offenders with no such history.  
 
There are two principal issues for consideration here. The first is whether the decision to impose a 
custodial or community sentence on repeat theft offenders appears to be based on the seriousness 
of the offence or whether they sentence was determined according to record. Second is the courts’ 
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Community Count 10 22 19 30 81 
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Total Count 30 44 42 109 225 
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use of fines and discharges against repeat offenders; if prior criminal history can be aggravating, why 
might the court decide not to impose a more punitive sentence? 
 
Custody and Repeat Offenders 
Table 2 indicates a tendency for repeat theft offenders to receive custodial or community sentences. 
Whilst prior record may have been a relevant consideration, in many cases the decision to imprison 
is explicable by reference to the greater seriousness of the offending, or due to the offender’s 
circumstances (for example recall to prison following reoffending on whilst on prison licence). A 
minority of cases, on the other hand, might offer some evidence of the courts sentencing on record. 
Case 023 involved the theft of hardware valued £45. The offender had accumulated 57 previous 
convictions, 22 of which were for theft, with nine theft convictions in the last year. He was ordered 
to serve a three month prison term, arguable significantly out of proportion to the seriousness of the 
offence. In case 144, the offender had stolen perfume valued £66. The offender was detained at the 
scene, the property was recovered and a guilty plea was entered; there was no apparent offence 
aggravation present. The offender had 44 previous convictions, 22 for thefts, with seven shopliftings 
being recorded in the past year. He was sentenced to 28 days’ imprisonment. Case 059 concerned a 
female offender who had stolen food valued £60. Similarly to case 144, there was no apparent 
offence aggravation. The offender had 19 previous convictions, 14 of which were for similar thefts, 
including 13 theft convictions in the year preceding the immediate offence. He was sentenced to 
four months’ imprisonment. In each case, the decision to imprison does not appear to be justified by 
reference only to the seriousness of the offence. The offender’s record, and the frequency of recent 
theft offending in particular, may explain the decision to imprison.41  
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The offender in cases 094 and 095 was sentenced to serve seven-day concurrent prison terms for 
two low-value shopliftings (£11 and £6 respectively). The decision to imprison was unlikely to have 
been made on the basis of offence seriousness, notwithstanding the commission of two offences – a 
fine would have been a more proportionate response - but the court seems to have been influenced 
by the offender’s prolific recent offending record, which included nine convictions (five for similar 
shopliftings) in the preceding twelve months. That being said, the offender had not been made the 
subject of a community sentence since 1994 (which was not breached). In the circumstances 
therefore, it seems odd that the court did not consider a community order in an attempt to address 
the offender’s criminality.42 
 
The sample included only three cases resulting in a suspended sentence; two imposed by the 
magistrates’ court and one in the Crown Court. The two magistrates’ cases were typical 
shopliftings,43 which ordinarily would not have crossed the custody threshold on the basis of 
seriousness owing to a lack of aggravating features. In case 051, the offender had stolen property 
valued £100 from a shop. She was detained at the scene, the property was recovered and an 
admission of guilt was made. The court suspended a 28-day period of imprisonment for six months. 
The offender had been made the subject of a CRO one year earlier, which was breached six months 
later following reconviction for shoplifting. As a result, the court revoked the CRO and resentenced 
her to a period of imprisonment. Since then, the offender had been imprisoned on a further 
occasion, again for shoplifting. The decision to impose a suspended sentence seems to have been 
based on both the offender’s prior history and offence seriousness. Whilst the court may not have 
believed that the gravity of the offence justified imposing a term of immediate imprisonment, the 
offender’s previous sentences had demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with community 
                                                          
42
 One might speculate that there was information available to the court, perhaps in a PSR, indicating that the offender was 
unwilling to cooperate with a community sentence or was otherwise unsuitable. 
43
 Many of the sample’s retail thefts occurred under common circumstances: the offender would enter the store, select the 
goods (usually of a modest value), conceal the property and attempt to leave the shop without offering payment. The 
offender would then be detained at the scene, where the property would be recovered and the offender would admit the 
offence. Little or no offence aggravation is apparent. These offences are referred to here as ‘typical’ shopliftings.  
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orders. This may have discouraged the court from imposing further community sentences even 
though such a penalty may have been a prima facie proportionate response to the offence.  If this 
was indeed the case, it would be evidence of the courts imposing suspended sentences even where 
the custody threshold is not crossed, perhaps viewing them instead as a non-custodial sentencing 
option which can thereby be imposed for cases only crossing the community-sentence threshold but 
falling short of the custody threshold.44  
 
Discharges, Fines and Repeat Offenders 
Table 2 shows that discharges and fines were imposed in 51 cases for offences committed by repeat 
theft offenders, including 27 where the offender had amassed ten or more convictions for similar 
offending. In contrast with the above cases, the offender’s significant criminal history was not 
enough to lead the court to impose a custodial (or community) sentence. In case 162 in which the 
offender had stolen from a shop alcohol valued £3.50, the court imposed a twelve-month 
conditional discharge, notwithstanding the offender’s history of 119 previous convictions including 
79 thefts. Likewise, in case 161, a conditional discharge was imposed on the offender who had 
committed a typical shoplifting, known to have been motivated by his drug addiction. He had 76 
previous convictions, including 25 thefts, and was conditionally discharged for 12 months. The 
offender had not been made the subject of a DTTO in the past. It is unknown why the court decided 
not to address the underlying cause of the offending through a rehabilitative disposal option but, 
owing to the non-serious nature of the offence, the sentence does not appear to be 
disproportionate. Similarly, the offender in case 134 had stolen goods valued £2.50 from a shop, and 
was detained at the scene whereupon he admitted the offence. Although he had a known drug 
addiction and his record included 22 previous convictions for similar offending, the court imposed a 
£25 fine, no doubt a reflection of the relative non-seriousness of the offence; no sentence premium 
was added in respect of the prior record.  
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 These concerns that suspended sentences could be imposed for cases only warranting a community sentence were 
raised in A .Bottoms, ‘The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967-1978’ (1981) 21 BJ Crim 15, at 15  
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Often, the decision to discharge repeat offenders appears to have been based on the offenders’ 
circumstances. In six of the 16 cases, the decision to discharge may have been based on the 
offenders’ recent break in offending. In case 088, the offender was made subject of a six-month 
conditional discharge following a guilty plea for shoplifting. Her last offence recorded was for 
shoplifting in 1998 (six years prior to the current offence) for which she was handed a £200 fine. 
Elsewhere, a discharge could also be imposed, even with a shorter break in offending: cases 127 and 
136 both concerned offenders with known drug addictions and both were dealt with by way of a 
conditional discharge. Both had lengthy records: the offender in case 127 had 33 previous 
convictions, including 11 for theft; the offender in case 136 also had 33 previous convictions, with 14 
thefts. They had a recent break in offending of eight months and one year respectively, which may 
have acted as a source of mitigation. The decision to discharge may have been based on the (albeit 
relatively short) break in offending. This suggests, if such was needed, that taking criminal history 
into account at sentencing is not a matter of merely counting the number of convictions; that there 
is significance in the contemporaneity and frequency of offending, and particular weight may be 
attached to a recent break in offending notwithstanding a lengthy record preceding it. 
 
In other cases, the offender’s discharge appears to have been determined on the basis of an existing 
order. In four of the 16 cases, a drug treatment and testing order had recently been imposed and 
was ordered to continue. The offender in each case was thereby discharged for the current offence. 
In one further case, the offender was voluntarily seeking drug treatment. His 23 similar previous 
convictions did not discourage the court from discharging him, seemingly not wishing to interfere 
with his drug treatment.  
 
Community Sentences and Repeat Offenders 
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Where an offender’s prior record demonstrates a pattern of offending, it will often inform the 
approach taken by the court in sentencing. As outlined below, during interview all judges and 
magistrates had identified rehabilitation as the primary purpose when sentencing persistent 
offenders whose criminality is born from a drug or alcohol addiction. Consequently, some offenders 
with lengthy records for similar offending may be more likely than others to receive seemingly 
disproportionate but rehabilitative sentences such as community rehabilitation orders (CRO) and 
drug treatment and testing orders (DTTO).45 This suggests that a community sentence may be 
imposed in cases where the seriousness of the current offence does not satisfy the threshold test 
under s.148(1) of the 2003 Act (and its predecessor under s.35(1) of the PCCSA 2000).46 If enacted, 
s.151 of the 2003 Act (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008), which 
substantially re-enacts s.59 of the 2000 Act, would permit the imposition of a community sentence 
upon an offender who had been fined on three previous occasions since the age of 18, whose 
current offence is not serious enough to warrant a community sentence, but for whom the court 
concludes such a sentence would be in the interests of justice. Whilst s.151 has not yet been brought 
into force, s.143(2) of the 2003 Act on the aggravating effect of previous convictions may render its 
enactment unnecessary: a court could regard the current offence as serious enough to warrant a 
custodial sentence in light of the offender’s previous convictions. Indeed this provides a wider power 
as, unlike s.151, it would empower the court to impose a community sentence even where the 
offender has not previously been fined on three or more occasions.  
 
The study included a number of cases resulting in a community sentence, apparently justified on the 
basis of offence seriousness. Yet elsewhere in the sample, it appears that a community sentence was 
imposed to reflect the offender’s criminal history. A 12-month CRO was imposed upon the offender 
                                                          
45
 These orders have since been replaced by the CJA 2003. S.177 provides 12 requirements that a court may make as a 
community sentence including a supervision requirement under s.213 (replacing the community rehabilitation order), and 
a drug rehabilitation requirement under ss.209-11 (replacing the drug treatment and testing order).  
46
 A court must not pass a community sentence unless of the opinion that the offence was “serious enough to warrant such 
a sentence.”  
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in case 065 following her admission to having stolen clothing valued £170 from a shop. The offender 
had ten previous convictions, including three for theft. Her co-offender had a clean prior record and 
was conditionally discharged. Since both had played an equal role in the offence, the difference in 
sentencing cannot be explained by reference to the offence. Rather, it must be due to a difference in 
the offenders’ characters. The value of the goods stolen probably placed the offence on the cusp of 
the community-sentence threshold. Whilst the co-offender’s clean record pulled the sentence down 
to a discharge, the offender’s prior convictions appears to have had the effect of placing the 
sentence more firmly in the community-sentence bracket. 
 
Case 215 appears to be a clear illustration of prior record being used to impose a disproportionate 
sentence. The offender had committed a typical shoplifting involving goods worth £17, for which a 
proportionate sentence may have been a fine. His prior record shows a recurring pattern of 
offending. The court imposed a 12-month and 50-hour community punishment and rehabilitation 
order (CPRO). It seems unlikely that the offence itself was serious enough to justify the imposition of 
a community sentence, particularly one as demanding as a CPRO, and the court may have taken a 
more punitive approach in light of his record. 
 
When sentencing offenders with drug addictions, the courts will often seek to rehabilitate the 
offender through the imposition of a DTTO, providing that the offence is does not cross the custody 
threshold or is so trivial that a community sentence would be clearly disproportionate. The sample 
included 35 cases (committed by 18 offenders) resulting in a DTTO; all involving thefts from shops. 
Twenty-four cases (committed by 14 offenders) involved typical shopliftings where the value of the 
property stolen was below £100. As relatively non-serious offences, the decision to impose a 
community sentence may not have been justified on the basis of offence seriousness.47 It was 
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 Where the offence was trivial, the court may have been dissuaded from imposing a DTTO, even where the offence was a 
consequence of the offender’s drug addiction. In case 134, the offender had committed theft from a shop, having stolen 
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common for offenders subjected to a DTTO to have numerous similar previous convictions, 
demonstrating a pattern of offending due to their addictions, which may have influenced the court 
to impose a DTTO in the hope of offering some rehabilitation. For example, the offender in case 112 
had committed a typical retail theft involving property valued £23. The gravity of the theft would 
point to no more than a fine on the basis of proportionate sentencing. He had 77 previous 
convictions, including 35 for theft. The court imposed a 12 month DTTO. The interviews showed a 
view unanimously held by all sentencers that the courts should aim to rehabilitate those who 
persistently offend due to a drug or alcohol dependency,48 although the court should pay regard to 
whether the offender’s addiction is susceptible to treatment in accordance with section 52(3) of the 
PCCSA 2000. Nevertheless, it is the offender’s record and criminogenic addiction which led the court 
to impose a community sentence. 
 
Whilst it appears that prior record may affect the type of sentence imposed, it can also have the 
effect of increasing the duration of a community-sentence beyond what a strictly proportionate 
approach would necessitate. CROs contained in the sample ranged from six to 24-months in 
duration, although the length of the order did not appear to necessarily reflect the gravity of the 
offence. Twelve cases resulted in the imposition of 18-month or 24-month orders, which included 
some of the more serious offences.49 However, long orders were also imposed for typical shopliftings 
committed by offenders with substantial criminal records, again indicating that gravity is informed by 
both offence and offender factors. Case 169 involved the typical shoplifting of goods worth £70. The 
offender had 110 previous convictions, 66 of which were for similar offences, and was made the 
subject of a 24-month CRO. Similarly, an 18-month order was imposed in case 137 following a £75 
typical shoplifting committed by an offender with 106 previous convictions including 33 thefts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
goods valued £2.50. The court ordered the offender to pay a £25 fine rather than imposing a DTTO. The offence may have 
been too trivial to justify the imposition of a community sentence. 
48
 See below 
49
 For example, cases 024 and 025 concerned an offender who had removed CCTV cameras worth £750 from two business 
premises. The offences were clearly planned and the offender had gone to the scene equipped to commit the thefts. 
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Where an offender’s record demonstrates a sustained pattern of offending, the court may believe 
that only a lengthy order would provide adequate opportunity to successfully rehabilitate the 
offender and reduce his propensity to reoffend. But from a purely proportionality perspective, the 
CROs in these cases should probably have been no more than half the durations that were imposed.   
 
Further evidence of prior history informing the duration of an order can be found in cases 027, 028 
and 029. Three offenders had climbed a fence and stolen scrap metal from a merchant’s yard at 
2.00am. Each offender was made the subject of a four-month night curfew, except for the offender 
in case 029 whose curfew was ordered to run for five months, perhaps due to his lengthy criminal 
record: whereas the offenders in cases 027 and 028 had six and seven previous theft convictions 
respectively, the offender in 029 had 39 previous convictions for similar offences. No doubt the fact 
that the offence occurred in the early morning influenced the court to impose curfews, which would 
restrict the liberty of the offenders and incapacitate them from committing further offences at 
similar times of the day, whilst the offences were serious enough to cross the community sentence 
threshold.  
 
Prior Record and Sentencers’ Opinions 
Part of this study involved a series of semi-structured interviews with magistrates and Crown Court 
judges, all of whom were asked of the weight they assigned to previous convictions, if any. All 
interviewees expressed the view that previous convictions were an important factor in the 
sentencing process, although they were careful not to overstate the role played. Interviewees 
tended to note an important, but limited, role afforded to previous convictions: 
Magistrate 3: I think [previous convictions] are important but on the other hand...they have actually 
served the sentence for what they have done before. You take them into account but 
not wholly depending on that. Some magistrates look at it differently. I look at it that 
they have already been punished for that...You do take it into account, but not too 
highly. 
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This view, that previous convictions are relevant at the sentencing stage but that the role must be 
carefully considered, was shared by many of those interviewed. Previous convictions were regarded 
as most important when indicating a pattern of offending, and interviewees demonstrated more 
certitude on this point: 
Magistrate 4: [The offender’s prior record is] significant if it shows a pattern of offending...You have 
to look at [similar] previous convictions when determining the penalty. I know they are a 
penalty served, and some people might say they are gone, been done and dusted and 
you should not pay any attention to them, but you have to because it shows a pattern of 
offending and it assists the way in which that punishment has to be imposed. 
 
The question of how much impact prior record has on sentence was not one with a seemingly easy 
answer. However, it became apparent during the interviews that, whilst the offender’s prior record 
is likely to be taken into consideration, the seriousness of the current offence remains the chief 
determinant of the penalty: 
Magistrate 8: I do not think the sentence is ever driven by the record. I always guide people to think 
of the record as the last thing. I would say that the antecedents is the last thing to look 
at and should not drive the sentence. 
  
All interviewees agreed that prior criminality may lead the court to take a different approach to 
sentencing, perhaps with a greater emphasis being placed on rehabilitation. This may not mean that 
the offender is necessarily made subject to a more punitive order per se, but rather a different type 
of sentence is chosen by virtue of the fact that a different approach has been adopted: 
Judge 2: If it is a minor offence of theft, the previous convictions may well be pushing you towards 
rehabilitation because it is recognising a pattern under which lies a drug problem. 
 
The responses to questions concerning previous convictions showed the courts were only too aware 
of the complexities involved in taking prior offences into account at sentencing. A Crown Court Judge 
believed it to be a difficult balancing exercise: 
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Judge 2: But the thing you have got to be very, very careful of about previous convictions is that you 
are not punishing someone yet again for what they have done before. Yes, it is an 
aggravating feature but it does not assume such proportions as to mean in effect they are 
being sentenced twice. 
 
Some interviewees also spoke of the significance attached to a clean record. Whilst a pattern of 
offending can be an aggravating feature, a clean prior record can act as significant mitigation. This 
seems to leave no neutral ground; either the offender will receive a discount for his clean record or 
any previous convictions will be used as a source of aggravation: 
 
Judge 1: What is very important, and I pay great regard to this, is the absence of previous convictions. 
I think we all do. It is a hugely mitigating feature that someone is doing this for the first 
time. I am not particularly persuaded by the fact that he has not got any convictions for 
stealing from a shop but he has got 1,001 previous convictions for burglary, or vice versa. I 
am impressed by the fact that he has never been in trouble before. 
 
The above quote by Judge One claims that a lack of any previous convictions, whether of a similar 
nature to the current offence or not, is a significant source of mitigation. Previous responses by other 
interviewees had demonstrated that relevant (similar) previous convictions acted in aggravation, but 
the existence of dissimilar previous offences are not an aggravating source. Together this leads to the 
conclusion that the only neutral-ground (where prior record is neither mitigating nor aggravating) 
occurs where an offender has only previous convictions of a dissimilar nature. He would not be 
entitled to mitigation for a clean prior record, but his record would not be aggravating since the 
convictions are of a dissimilar nature to the current offence.  
 
Conclusions 
The quest for perfection in proportionality is elusive: there will rarely (if ever) be a single 
proportionate sentence for an offence. Deciding whether or not a sentence is proportionate is an art 
rather than a science, and the measurement of offence seriousness is ultimately subjective. Recently 
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there has been a call to abolish imprisonment for all property offences, irrespective of the offender’s 
record, since these crimes should not be regarded as sufficiently serious to cross the custody 
threshold.50 Whilst this view is not adopted here, the case analysis is nevertheless based on a 
subjective interpretation of the seriousness of each offence and, therefore, the likely impact of prior 
record.  
 
Studies on sentencing statistics show that repeat offenders are more likely than first-time offenders 
to receive custodial sentences, but these statistics do not consider offence seriousness.51 This study 
offers some evidence of previous convictions informing the sentencing decision, either by pushing 
the sentence over the community sentence or custody threshold, or by impacting on the length of 
sentence, particularly in relation to the imposition of community sentences. A disproportionate 
custodial sentence may be imposed following very frequent and recent offending, rather than 
merely on the basis of the number of previous convictions the offender has accumulated. 
Conversely, the offender’s record in other cases appears to have had no impact on the sentencing 
decision, with some repeat offenders receiving financial penalties and discharges. Often, this 
decision appears to be based on the offender’s circumstances at the time (such as his subjection to a 
pre-existing court order) or, perhaps, is due to the relative non-seriousness of the offence. In the 
majority of custody cases, the decision to imprison may have been justified by reference to offence 
seriousness, although that is not to say that the offender’s record was not a material factor.   
 
There have been suggestions that statutory provisions relating to the relevance of previous 
convictions are not routinely referred to in court.52 However, the current sentencing guidelines on 
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 A. Ashworth, What if Imprisonment Were Abolished for Property Offences? (2013, Howard League for Penal Reform) 
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 For example, C. Flood-Page & A. Mackie, Sentencing Practice: An examination of Decisions in Magistrates’ Courts and the 
Crown Court in the Mid-1990s (1998, Home Office Research Study 180, Home Office) 
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 M. Wasik ‘Dimensions of Criminal History: Reflections on Theory and Practice’, in J. V. Roberts & A. von Hirsch (eds), 
Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives (2010, Hart), at 181 
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theft make reference to previous convictions as an aggravating factor.53 These guidelines were 
produced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council and will remain in force until the Sentencing Council 
issues its own guidelines to succeed them.54 Guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council, which 
do not cover theft, similarly make reference to the aggravating effect of previous convictions, but 
also provide that a clean prior record, or lack of relevant and recent convictions, is a mitigating 
factor.55 However, the guidelines do not advise on the weight to be attached to previous convictions 
and whether prior record can justify a disproportionate sentence. The duty on courts is to impose a 
sentence within the offence range, rather than the narrower category range.56  Prior record may 
thereby push the sentence into a higher category than that determined by the seriousness of the 
offence, without constituting a departure from the guidelines. 
 
Section 143(2) of the CJA 2003 has been in force for almost a decade, yet there remains apparent 
uncertainty over how previous convictions ought to impact the sentencing decision. This uncertainty 
is palpable from the interviews with magistrates and judges discussed here, where interviewees 
expressed a view that prior record is a relevant consideration, but the precise role played is much 
more difficult to articulate. Nevertheless, the general view appears to be that prior record should not 
eclipse proportionality as the primary sentence determinant. The courts have parallel duties to have 
regard to the seriousness of the offence whilst also viewing prior record as an aggravating factor. The 
role of previous convictions needs to be placed within the context of both offence seriousness and 
the offender’s circumstances. A cursory review of some recent Court of Appeal judgments helps to 
illustrate this conflict. In R v Byrne,57 the Court held that whilst the appellant had “an appalling 
record” of similar offending, the sentence imposed by the trial judge was out of proportion to the 
offence committed: “any determinate sentence should bear some relationship to the seriousness of 
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the offence for which it is passed.” Similar judgments were given in R v Neasham,58 R v Gibson,59 R v 
Langley,60 and most recently R v Bailey.61 However, the Court in R v Taylor62 held that the appellant’s 
previous convictions were rightly regarded as “very considerable aggravating features” which 
justified a sentence at the upper end of the appropriate sentence range for the offence as prescribed 
by the relevant guideline, if not beyond the appropriate range. This demonstrates the weight that 
weight that may be attributed to prior record, with the consequence of pushing at the confines of 
proportionality, if not swinging the gate wide open.  
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